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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION-ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS-RECEIPT OF 
EVIDENCE IN CAMERA-During an adjudicatory hearing pursuant to a com-
plaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission, counsel for the Commission 
offered as evidence some confidential documents subpoenaed from respond-
ent. The hearing examiner, on his own motion, ordered all confidential doc-
uments placed in camera.1 Counsel for the FTC objected to the order and 
filed an interlocutory appeal to the Commission. On the interlocutory ap-
peal, held, error in part. Because these documents do not contain highly 
secret business information they must appear on the public transcript, unless 
tendered to the Commission and obtained subject to an express stipulation 
that, if offered in evidence, they would be placed in camera. In order to 
support an in camera ruling, respondent must show that public disclosure 
would result in a serious, clearly-defined injury to its interests. H. P. Hood 
& Sons, TRADE REG. R.EP.1[ 29461 (FTC 1961). 
In today's economy, the secrecy of business data which relates to 
promotional strategy, research and development, and manufacturing 
processes can be essential, in certain industries, to the maintenance of a 
lawfully advantageous or competitive position.2 Moreover, business concerns 
are desirous of keeping confidential a variety of information in order to 
avoid embarrassing criticism, treble damage actions, and direct prosecution 
by governmental agencies.3 The activities of many parties, nevertheless, 
threaten exposure of such confidential data to the public and especially to 
business adversaries. For example, federal agencies4 and grand juries5 
may subpoena confidential documents, and private parties also may seek 
1 "[D]ocuments made subject to such orders are not made a part of the public record 
but are kept secret and only respondents, their counsel and authorized Commission 
personnel are permitted access thereto." Principal case at 37790. 
2 See generally Furach, Industrial Espionage, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1959, p. 6. 
Especially important to competitors is information which concerns pricing, sales statistics, 
cost data, promotional strategy, research and development, and manufacturing processes. 
3 See BNA Antitrust &: Trade Reg. Rep., Nov. 28, 1961, p. B-1. 
4 Clarke v. FTC, 128 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1942) (FTC subpoena for confidential 
documents enforced) • With respect to the powers of other agencies to obtain confidential 
information, see generally 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 3.06 (1958). 
5 Application of Radio Corp. of America, 13 F.R.D. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) . 
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them through the use of discovery procedures.6 If an administrative agency 
or a grand jury obtains such information during an investigatory hearing, 
the confidential nature of the material is not endangered directly.7 The 
public nature of the judicial process, however, limits the protection which 
the courts are able to give to confidential data introduced as evidence. 
Traditionally, it rests in the judge's discretion "to determine whether, to 
whom and under what precautions" such documents should be made 
available.8 Although there is some confusion with respect to the scope of the 
protection afforded, the courts apparently employ the in camera procedure 
only if the documents reveal a secret manufacturing process.9 
When the FTC institutes formal proceedings against a suspected 
violator it sometimes becomes necessary to introduce as evidence a variety 
of confidential data.10 The Commission's hearing examiners, in order to 
protect businesses from unnecessary injury, had developed a rather liberal 
practice of withholding confidential documents from the public transcript 
through the medium of in camera hearings, although there is no express 
provision in the rules for such treatment.11 In the principal case the 
Commission critically considered this policy for the first time and, in the 
process, severely limited its scope. Valuable trade secrets such as manu-
facturing processes or customer lists presumptively satisfy the newly 
enunciated test and will receive protection from disclosure through an in 
camera order.12 But with respect to other types of data, hearing examiners 
6 See, e.g., Burroughs v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 491 (D. Mass. 1952); 
Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co., 27 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1938). 
7 Grand jury minutes generally are not available to private parties. Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959) ; United States v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 
356 U.S. 677 (1958) • The FTC, moreover, has been denied access to them. In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 2219 (E.D:Pa. Nov. 14, 1961). Furthermore, under the 
rules of the FTC all investigatory proceedings are nonpublic, 16 C.F.R. § 1.41 (1960) , and 
other federal agencies have similar rules. See generally 1 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 4, 
§ 3.13. Once these agencies, however, acquire confidential information or documents, 
the policies which govern their release vary from agency to agency. See id. 
s E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917). 
9 See Herold v. Herold China &: Pottery Co., 257 Fed. 911, 918 (6th Cir. 1919) ; Griffin 
Mfg. Co. v. Gold Dust Corp., 245 App. Div. 385, 282 N.Y. Supp. 931 (1935) • See generally 
4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.22 (1950) ; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2212 (McNaughton 
rev. ed. 1961) • 
10 See principal case at 37792. Respondents in FTC proceedings have been required 
to give testimony or produce documents which involve trade secrets in spite of their 
objections. Clarke v. FTC, 128 F .2d 542 (9th Cir. 1942) • The failure, furthermore, to 
produce such information when material to the inquiry may produce a strong presumption 
of guilt. Charles of the Ritz Dist. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) • 
11 See National Dairy Prod. Corp., 55 F.T.C. 2069 (1959); American Cyanamid Co., 
55 F.T.C. 2049 (1958). 
12 The FTC Act § 6 (f), amended by 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 46 (f) (1958), 
prohibits the publication of either "trade secrets or customer lists" by the Commission. 
This limitation, however, does not preclude inclusion in the hearing transcript of 
such material when it is relevant to the matter in controversy. FTC v. Tuttle, 244 F.2d 
605 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925 (1957). 
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are not hereafter to grant in camera protection unless respondents show that 
severe economic damage will result if the public record contains the docu-
ment in question. Further, a mere showing of embarrassment, exposure to 
treble damage proceedings, or the desire of competitors to gain access to 
the documents for business reasons will not support an in camera order. 
In justification of its new position, the Commission noted that the 
restrictions placed on the hearing examiners' discretion with respect to 
the receipt of evidence in camera may have two significant and desirable 
effects. First, implementation of this policy assures a more comprehensive 
public transcript.13 The documents and other evidence contained therein 
will aid private litigants in treble damage actions founded on similar 
grounds.14 Second, the publicity accorded documents received as evidence 
may act as an effective prospective policing device. Companies may avoid 
illegal business activities because they will fear public exposure of confi-
dential documents in later FTC proceedings. But it would seem that a 
procedural policy justified on such grounds, since serving no apparent 
judicial purpose, is initially open to question. In order to permit parties 
to cross-examine opposing witnesses and view adverse evidence, general 
judicial policy favors open and public adjudicatory hearings.15 Nevetheless, 
this judicial attitude sanctions the in camera treatment of business secrets 
which, under the Commission's newly enunciated policy, will be included 
in the public transcript.16 
Effectuation of this new policy depends somewhat on the number of 
confidential documents free of any protective stipulation which the Com-
mission obtains during a formal, non-investigatory hearing. The Com-
mission frequently does not control the procedures invoked to procure 
such documents.17 Some courts, perhaps with knowledge of the burdens 
13 Any interested party may obtain a hearing transcript. 26 Fed. Reg. 6018 (1961) , 
amending 16 C.F.R. § 4.14 (£) (1960) . 
14 Private parties face substantial difficulties when they seek to acquire confidential 
documents in the possession of third parties. See E. B. Muller &: Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 
511 (6th Cir. 1944); Louis Weinberg Associates, Inc. v. Monte Christi Corp., 15 F.R.D. 
493 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ; Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 12 
F.R.D. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Joseph A. Kaplan &: Sons, TRADE REG. REP. 1f 29193 (FTC 
1960) • The FTC regularly refuses to produce confidential documents in its possession. 
Mohawk Ref. Corp. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1959); Texas Co., 30 U.S.L. WEEK 
2452 (FTC Mar. 9, 1962) • See generally Miller, Availability and Use of Non-Public 
Governmental Records and Reports in Civil Litigation, 9 SYRACUSE L. REv. 163 (1958) ; 
Comment, 36 B.U.L. REv. 118 (1956). 
15 See E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, 63 F.2d 362, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1933); 1 DAVIS, 
op. cit. supra note 4, § 8.09. 
16 Cf. FTC v. Bowman, 149 F. Supp. 624, 631 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 248 F.2d 456 (7th 
Cir. 1957). 
17 The Commission issues the subpoena, but if it is returned unsatisfied the federal 
courts enforce it. FTC Act § 9, amended by 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958). 
See St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961); Oklahoma Press Publishing 
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) • 
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which parties must bear in other respects during formal hearings,18 indicate 
a distinct reluctance to enforce FTC subpoenas for confidential information 
absent a stipulation to protect from injury the party contributing the 
documents.19 The subpoena powers of the Commission, nevertheless, are 
so broad that business concerns under investigation voluntarily contribute 
many documents of a confidential nature to the FTC.2° Companies, how-
ever, ordinarily attach a stipulation to such documents which, if accepted 
by the Commission,.:will protect the data from public disclosure.21 Although 
there is no legal compulsion on the FTC to honor such stipulations, it 
announced in the principal case that they would not be. violated. The 
Commission, during nonpublic investigational activities, depends on the 
cooperation of industry, rather than its subpoena power, for the production 
of documents.22 
If the FTC discontinued the policy of honoring stipulations, it perhaps 
would find it necessary to apply to the federal courts to enforce an increasing 
number of subpoenas when issued for confidential documents. The need 
to take such action would place a heavy burden on judicial time and on 
the Commission's financial and personnel resources. Finally, the FTC, 
in view of the forces arrayed to protect the confidential nature of data 
submitted to it, apparently can compel public disclosure only when it is 
in direct control of the procedures under which such material is received 
as evidence. Thus, hearing examiners do not accept confidential docu-
ments entered as evidence in defense of formal charges unless they appear 
on the public transcript.23 Parties unable to protect business secrets as a 
result of this practice may forego any defense to the action, and accept a 
consent order24 or a stipulation25 settled in private rather than risk the 
unwanted disclosure wnich may occur during litigation. 
Peter W. Williamson 
18 See MAsoN, THE LANGUAGE OF DISSENT (1959) ; Kintner, Federal Administrative 
Law in the Decade of the Sixties, 47 A.B.A.J. 269, 278 (1961); Editorial Note, 13 RUTGERS 
L. REv. 315 (1958) • 
19 FTC v. Bowman, 149 F. Supp. 624, 631 (N.D. Ill.), afj'd, 248 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 
1957); Menzies v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 164, 171 (D. Md. 1956), afj'd, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 
1957). 
20 See 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 29-31. 
21 See principal case -at 37794. 
22 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 29-31. 
23 Sperry Rand Corp., 1961 TRADE REG. REP. ,r 15468, request for interlocutory appeal 
denied, TRADE REc. REP. 1f 15569 (FTC 1961). 
24 26 Fed. Reg. 6015 (1961), amending 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-.4 (1960). See generally 
1 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 4.02. 
25 16 C.F.R. § 1.54 (1960). See also 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 90. See generally 1 DAVIS, 
op. cit. supra note 4, § 4.02. 
